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Abstract 
Implementing international norms is a core aspect of global governance. It raises the question 
of whether, and through which mechanisms, developments at the international level can influ-
ence domestic policymaking. While students of global governance have placed much empha-
sis on processes of bargaining within international regimes and hegemonic coercion by indi-
vidual states or international organizations to explain how international agendas reach the 
domestic level, this paper argues that diffusion constitutes a third and distinct mode of global 
governance which has not received due attention so far. The paper first outlines the concept 
of policy diffusion and distinguishes it from other mechanisms of global governance. It draws 
on theories on the domestic effects of international norms and institutions developed within the 
field of international relations as well as theories of policy diffusion and policy transfer devel-
oped within comparative public policy. Based on an empirical analysis of the international 
spread of national environmental policy plans and sustainable development strategies, the 
paper then demonstrates how cross-national imitation and learning matters as a mechanism 
of implementing the global norm of sustainable development and how these processes of pol-
icy diffusion interact with other, more institutionalized, forms of international governance such 
as unilateral imposition and multilateral harmonization. The paper concludes with general per-
spectives on the theoretical as well as practical consequences of conceptualizing policy diffu-
sion as a crucial component of global governance and on its potential as a mechanism for 
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 1 Introduction 
Implementing international norms is a core aspect of global governance. It raises the central 
question of whether, and through which mechanisms, developments at the international level 
can influence domestic policymaking. Scholars of global governance have placed much em-
phasis on processes of multilateral negotiating within international regimes and unilateral coer-
cion by individual states or international organizations to explain how international agendas 
reach the domestic level. Drawing from an empirical case study on the national implementation 
of sustainable development, this paper argues that cross-national diffusion constitutes a third 
and distinct mode of global governance which has not received due attention so far. 
The first section of this paper analyses the distinctive characteristics of the concept of sustain-
able development and what this means for its implementation. The second part introduces the 
concept of policy diffusion as one of three analytically distinct mechanisms of global govern-
ance. It draws on theories of the domestic effects of international norms and institutions devel-
oped within the field of international relations as well as theories of policy diffusion and policy 
transfer developed within public policy. Section three briefly links the typology of governance 
mechanisms proposed in this paper to the findings of other related theoretical debates. 
Through an empirical case study on the international spread of national environmental policy 
plans and strategies for sustainable development, the fourth section demonstrates how cross-
national imitation and learning matters as a mechanism for implementing the global norm of 
sustainable development and how these processes of policy diffusion interact with other, more 
institutionalized, forms of international governance. The paper concludes with general perspec-
tives on the theoretical as well as practical consequences of conceptualizing policy diffusion as 
a crucial component of global governance and on its potential as a mechanism for implement-
ing sustainable development. 
2 Sustainable Development:  
An International Norm for National Implementation 
Unlike many other norms which have begun as domestic norms and have become international 
through the efforts of policy entrepreneurs of various kinds (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998: 893), 
the concept of sustainable development is genuinely international in nature, meaning that its 
origins cannot be tracked down to any national programme or political discourse. It was devel-
oped within the United Nations system by the Brundtland Commission and introduced into the 
political debate through the publication of the Commission’s 1987 report Our Common Future.1 
A guideline for political action, sustainable development is therefore brought to national gov-
                                                
1 According to the standard definition of the Brundtland Commission, ‘sustainable development is development that meets the 
needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs’ (WCED, 1987: 43) See, 
however, the discussion of this definition in Lafferty (2004). 
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ernments ‘from the outside in’ (Lafferty, 2004).2 In addition to being genuinely international, 
sustainable development is a strongly normative concept ‘used to prescribe and evaluate 
changes in living conditions’ (Lafferty, 1996: 189). It thus corresponds to what scholars have 
termed a ‘prescriptive’ or ‘evaluative’ norm, setting basic standards of appropriate behavior for 
states and organizations as well as individuals.3 
Through a series of international conferences, the most influential of which were the 1992 Earth 
Summit in Rio de Janeiro (UNCED) and the 2002 World Summit on Sustainable Development 
in Johannesburg (WSSD); through the translation of its normative content into a set of more 
specified rules and guidelines as in the global action plan Agenda 21; and through the setting 
up of new international bodies such as the United Nations Commission on Sustainable Devel-
opment, the concept of sustainable development has over the last decade and a half become 
successfully institutionalized at the international level. International institutionalization is, how-
ever, only a first and far from sufficient step in the process of making this concept operational. 
The necessary next step is the effective implementation of sustainable development at the level 
of the nation state, that is, the translation of this set of globally anchored prescriptions into do-
mestic policymaking (OECD, 2001a).4 
In theoretical terms this challenge of implementing sustainable development ‘from the outside 
in’ raises the more general question of whether and how the international agenda can influence 
or determine domestic agendas. This touches upon core questions of global governance: How 
do international norms reach the domestic arena? Through which mechanisms do they affect 
the interests and preferences of national actors (Checkel, 1999; Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998; 
Cortell and Davis, 1996)?5 If, as James Rosenau argues, global governance is ‘about the main-
tenance of collective order, the achievement of collective goals, and the collective processes of 
rule through which order and goals are sought’ (Rosenau, 2000: 175), then the question of do-
mestic implementation of sustainable development constitutes a crucial touchstone for the ef-
fectiveness of global governance in general, or, in other words, for the international system’s 
capacity to govern itself. 
                                                
2 Although an early predecessor of sustainable development can be found in the physical concept of ‘sustainability’ as tradi-
tionally used in German forestry, this older idea was concerned only with the maintainability of national resources and lacked 
the dimensions of human welfare and social equity introduced by the Brundtland Report (Lafferty, 1996).  
3 For a systematic distinction of regulative, constitutive and prescriptive norms, see Finnemore and Sikkink (1998: 251-252). 
4 For a systematic analysis of early national efforts to implement sustainable development, see Lafferty and Meadowcroft 
(2000) as well as the five case studies in OECD (2002). 
5 This ‘top-down’ perspective fits well into an emerging theoretical and empirical literature in international relations and Euro-
peanization studies which focuses on the domestic effects of international norms and institutions (Martin and Simmons, 
1998) or asks how ‘European integration and Europeanization (...) affect domestic policies, politics, and polities of the mem-
ber states and beyond?’ (Börzel and Risse, 2003). 
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3 Three Mechanisms of Global Governance 
The term governance has emerged within international relations studies in the course of the 
1980s and has become increasingly popular during the 1990s. Basically global governance 
means ‘the formal and informal bundle of rules, roles and relationships that define and regulate 
the social practices of states and nonstate actors in international affairs’ (Slaughter, Tulumello 
and Wood, 1998: 371); or, even more broadly, ‘the many ways individuals and institutions, pub-
lic and private, manage their common affairs’ (Commission for Global Governance, 1995: 2). 
While in definitional terms many scholars today agree on such a broad understanding 
(Rosenau, 1992), in practice international or global governance is often used as more or less 
synonymous with the narrower notion of international regimes (Young, 1997: 5-6; Smouts, 
1998). Kratochwil and Ruggie (1986: 759) pointed this out already in the mid-1980s, and Martin 
and Simmons have more recently described the regimes movement as ‘an effort to substitute 
an understanding of international organization with an understanding of international govern-
ance’ (Martin and Simmons, 1998: 737). This widespread practice of equating governance with 
regimes is, however, problematic in conceptual terms and is not fully supported by empirical 
evidence. 
International regimes, characterized as deliberately constructed ‘social institutions consisting of 
agreed upon principles, norms, rules, procedures and programmes that govern the interactions 
of actors in specific issue areas’ (Levy, Young and Zürn, 1995: 274; see also Krasner, 1983: 2; 
Hasenclever, Mayer and Rittberger, 2000: 3), are conceptually too narrow to grasp all possible 
mechanisms through which international political factors affect domestic policymaking. Four 
arguments may serve to substantiate this claim. 
First, non-state actors play a more important role in global governance than the concept of in-
ternational regimes can convincingly account for.6 While attempts recently have been made to 
model the role of non-state actors within international regimes (Arts, 2000), these attempts ob-
viously do not aim to theorize their importance outside international institutions. 
Second, the notion, stressed especially in neo-institutionalist accounts, that regimes are nego-
tiated (Rittberger, 1993; Keohane, 1983, 1984) or ‘deliberately constructed’ (Hasenclever, 
Mayer and Rittberger, 2000: 3) excludes important instances of international policy coordination 
which occur in the absence of multilateral cooperation. The argument put forth here is that both 
bilateral coercion and cross-national diffusion are important mechanisms of global policy coor-
dination which are insufficiently accounted for in the regime concept. 
Third, the notion that regimes include the complete set of general principles and norms as well 
as specific rules and procedures implies a relatively high degree of international institutionaliza-
tion in a given issue area. However, as research on international norm dynamics has revealed, 
                                                
6 On the importance of non-state actors in international politics, see for example Keck and Sikkink (1998) and Risse-Kappen 
(1995).  
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institutionalization is not a necessary precondition for international agendas to affect domestic 
decision-making (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998: 260). Global norms and principles can become 
influential domestically without first being spelled out in specific rules and procedures. Global 
governance, therefore, does not exclusively occur through international regimes. 
Finally, in certain fields of global politics – especially those connected with North-South rela-
tionships such as development assistance – there is no single set of principles, norms and 
rules around which the expectations of all actors converge7 (Smouts, 1998: 86-87). Rather, one 
group of actors imposes its principles and rules upon another group of actors. Convergence 
then does not occur at the level of expectations, or – as constructivists might argue – at the 
level of interests and preferences, but merely at the level of formal policy-outputs. 
If international regimes are only one – albeit a crucial – mechanism of global governance, then 
what other pathways exist through which international processes can lead to domestic policy 
change? Empirical research on the international sources of domestic environmental politics 
across a large number of policy innovations and an ample set of countries has revealed that 
international stimuli can generally influence domestic politics through three analytically distinct 
mechanisms: multilateral harmonization, unilateral imposition, and cross-national diffusion 
(Busch and Jörgens, 2003). These mechanisms differ in a number of important ways, notably 
with regard to the underlying mode of operation, the level of obligation they involve8, and the 
specific motivations of national policymakers9 (see Table 1). While the impact of harmonization 
and imposition on domestic policymaking has been studied to some extent within international, 
comparative and European studies10, the functioning of diffusion as a governance mechanism 
stands only at the beginning of being systematically explored.11 In the following, therefore, har-
monization and imposition will be treated more briefly, whereas the motivations of policymakers 
                                                
7 This is Krasner’s classical definition of international regimes as ‘sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and deci-
sion-making procedures around which actors' expectations converge in a given area of international relations’ (Krasner, 
1983: 2).  
8 Obligation is understood in a formal sense. It ‘means that states or other actors are bound by a rule or commitment or by a 
set of rules or commitments’ (Abbott et al., 2000: 401).  
9 The term 'policymakers' refers to a ‘heterogeneous collection of officials and organizations concerned with one or more policy 
areas’ (Rose, 1993: 52). 
10 Research on international regimes or international institutions more broadly has for long been central to the study of interna-
tional relations (Simmons and Martin, 2002). In the environmental field recent systematic studies on regime effectiveness 
and compliance with multilateral agreements in the environmental field include Miles et al. (2001), Haas, Keohane and Levy 
(1993) and Brown Weiss and Jacobson (2000). Reviews of the literature can be found, for example, in Hasenclever, Mayer 
and Rittberger (1997, 2000) and Levy, Young and Zürn (1995). Unilateral imposition or coercive transfer of norms, rules and 
procedures has been critically analysed in the literature on conditionality in development assistance. More recently, the role 
of environmental conditionality in development aid politics has been systematically explored (see several of the contributions 
in Keohane and Levy, 1996). Phenomena of unilateral imposition have also been studied in relation to the process of Eastern 
Enlargement of the European Union and the conditions that Central and Eastern European countries have to fulfil before be-
ing granted EU membership (see, for example, Grabbe, 2002; Tews, 2002, 2003). 
11 The idea that diffusion could be understood as a governance mechanism in its own right was first expressed by Kristine Kern 
(2000: 249). Subsequent diffusion studies in the environmental field have repeated this claim (Kern, Jörgens and Jänicke, 
2001: 3-4; Jörgens, 2001: 124-125; Tews and Busch, 2002), but to date no comprehensive and systematic effort has been 
made to theorize diffusion as a distinct mechanism of global governance and to explore its relationship and interaction with 
other governance mechanisms. 
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to engage in processes of policy diffusion and the factors that promote or hinder the global 
spread of policy innovations will be explored in greater detail. 
Table 1: Three Mechanisms of Global Governance 
 Harmonization Imposition Diffusion 
Mode of operation Multilateral cooperation 
and decision-making 
Unilateral conditionality 
(political or economic) 
Decentral imitation,  
persuasion/learning 
Level of obligation Medium to high High Low 




− Avoid trade distor-
tions 
− Join existing interna-
tional organizations 
or treaties 
− Obtain financial or 
technical aid 
− Search for solution to 
domestic problems  
− Reduce uncertainty 
− Avoid negative  
externalities of other 
states' actions 
− Gain internal and  
external legitimacy 
Principal driving force Interest Power Knowledge 
3.1 Harmonization 
As used here the term ‘harmonization’ means the conscious modification of internal policies by 
governments committed to multilateral standards which they have had a hand in drafting 
(Howlett, 2000: 308). It is roughly identical with regime governance as it relates to the formula-
tion and implementation of multilateral agreements within international regimes as well as to the 
implementation of decisions taken within supranational organizations such as the European 
Union. Unlike imposition and diffusion, harmonization involves the deliberate and cooperative 
attempt by a particular set of countries to solve problems which they are collectively confronted 
with. The sources and targets of governance are therefore broadly identical. The principal moti-
vations for states to engage in processes of international harmonization are to address collec-
tive, typically transboundary, problems which cannot be solved by any one country alone; or to 
standardize different national regulations in order to reduce barriers to the free movement of 
people, capital and goods and avoid trade distortions. While states are free to engage in multi-
lateral decision-making and, if they choose, to have an active influence on the outcomes, once 
an agreement is reached, they are more or less strongly obliged to comply and to implement 
the agreement in their national context.12 As Diane Stone argues, harmonization involves some 
sacrifice of national autonomy and sovereignty (Stone, 2001). 
The level of formal obligation involved in harmonization processes is therefore relatively high. It 
is highest in EC law, due to the supremacy of European over national law and its enforcement 
                                                
12 Normally international accords only come into force after having been ratified by a predefined amount of signatory states. 
Similarly for individual states they only become effective after these states have ratified the treaty.  
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by the European Court of Justice, and, to a slightly lesser degree, in binding international ac-
cords: Non-binding international commitments (declarations, and programmes of action, in the 
‘soft-law’ category (Shelton, 2000)), involve, on the other hand, only intermediary levels of for-
mal obligation.13 
3.2 Imposition 
Imposition occurs when individual states, international organizations or private actors use 
asymmetric power relationships to dictate their policies to other states. It involves one country 
being intentionally forced to adopt the policies favored by another country, by an international 
organization or by a private actor, for example a transnational corporation. While military coer-
cion is a very rare phenomenon and plays virtually no role in ‘low’ politics like environmental 
protection or sustainable development14; economic or political conditionality – as used in devel-
opment assistance or in the process of European Union enlargement – are more common 
forms of imposition. Like harmonization, imposition involves a high level of obligation as states 
formally commit themselves to implement externally prescribed policies. It differs from harmoni-
zation in that the principal motivations of the sources and targets of governance no longer coin-
cide. While international organizations basically aim to export their fundamental values and 
principles or their preferred solutions for particular problems, importing countries are interested 
primarily in material or political gains such as monetary assistance, access to international trea-
ties, or membership in exclusive 'clubs' like the European Union. Usually importing countries 
have little or no influence on the design of the policies that are being imposed upon them. 
3.3 Diffusion 
Finally diffusion, in Everett Rogers' influential definition, refers to ‘the process by which an inno-
vation is communicated through certain channels over time among the members of the social 
system’ (Rogers, 1995: 5). It is a process of imitation or learning where information about inno-
vative practices in one setting affects policy choices in another (Simmons and Elkins, 2003). 
Contrary to harmonization and imposition, diffusion occurs in the absence of formal or contrac-
tual obligation as no formal commitments towards other governments or international organiza-
tions exist to implement a certain policy.15 The main rationale of diffusion lies in the fact that 
actors tend to place excessive importance on information that is readily available, thus favoring 
policies that are already in place in other countries over those policy options that have not yet 
been adopted elsewhere (Weyland, 2002). Like the related concepts of ‘emulation’ (Hoberg, 
                                                
13 Note that the degree of obligation is not a measure of effectiveness. The growing concern about EC directives which in spite 
of being characterized by a high level of obligation are often not implemented properly by the member states illustrates this. 
14 This does not mean that the use of military force plays no role in the fight for scarce natural resources.  
15 Note that ‘diffusion’, as the term is used in this paper, is not identical with the broader notions of ‘spread’ or ‘proliferation’. 
Diffusion, understood as the non-compulsory use of foreign exemplars in domestic policymaking, is only one possible cause 
of the international spread of policy innovations. Other important causes that are identified in this paper include harmoniza-
tion and imposition, but also individual national problem pressures such as environmental degradation. 
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1991) and ‘policy transfer’ (Dolowitz and Marsh, 1996, 2000), policy diffusion involves ‘the rec-
ognition of foreign exemplars and their incorporation into new or existing policies’ (Howlett, 
2000: 308). However, while emulation and policy transfer relate to individual cases, diffusion, 
as generally used in political science, comprises the sum of many cases of policy emulation 
with regard to a given policy innovation. Often, these individual processes are only loosely con-
nected. In other words, diffusion processes become manifest only through the accumulation of 
individual cases of imitation or lesson-drawing regarding one and the same policy innovation. 
Its decentralized and unconnected nature – where the policies of one country can be influential 
in shaping the policies of another without the country of origin even noticing it – sharply distin-
guishes diffusion from harmonization and, although to a lesser degree, from imposition.16 
3.3.1 Causes of Policy Diffusion 
National policymakers emulate other countries' policies for various reasons. They may act in a 
rational and problem-oriented manner by looking across national borders for effective solutions 
to pressing domestic problems. This is what Richard Rose (1991, 1993) has labelled ‘lesson-
drawing’.17 In situations where domestic actors face great uncertainties about the likelihood of 
present policy alternatives to bring about their preferred future outcomes, they may model their 
own policy choices on those of countries which are generally perceived as being successful. 
This is, in essence, what DiMaggio and Powell (1983: 151-152) refer to as ‘mimetic isomor-
phism’. Especially at early stages of a diffusion process, state policymakers may also be ac-
tively persuaded by other state or non-state actors – such as other states, international organi-
zations, transnational NGOs or participants in inter- or transnational professional networks – to 
adopt policies that are practised by only a small number of pioneering states (Finnemore, 1993; 
Keck and Sikkink, 1998; Haas, 1992). During the later stages of diffusion processes, when a 
policy innovation has already been adopted by a fair amount of states18, the importance of ar-
gumentative persuasion or the search for effective solutions to given problems as stimuli for 
political action may become secondary. Other motivations, such as international pressures for 
conformity, the attempt of political elites to increase the legitimacy of their actions, and their 
desire to enhance their self-esteem within an international society structured by emerging nor-
mative standards of appropriate behavior, may then become increasingly important (Finnemore 
and Sikkink, 1998: 895, 902-904). 
                                                
16 Presumably it is this decentralized character, where patterns of global governance are not intentionally produced within 
international institutions or by powerful nation-states but emerge gradually from a succession of individual actions, which has 
caused a general reluctance on the part of many scholars to conceive of diffusion as a governance mechanism in its own 
right. 
17 Although in practice there may be some overlap, analytically it differs from problem-oriented harmonization in that the prob-
lems at cause are perceived to be domestic rather than transboundary. 
18 Finnemore and Sikkink speak of a ‘critical mass’ of countries (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998; see also Kern et al., 2001: 10-
11). 
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Moreover, competition among states and the desire to avoid future economic or political disad-
vantages or adjustment costs may motivate states to imitate the actions of their primary com-
petitors. Political competition occurs when states struggle to shape policy developments at the 
international level in accordance with their national policy patterns and regulatory traditions in 
order to minimize the costs of political and economic adjustment to upcoming binding regula-
tions (Héritier, Knill and Mingers, 1996; Andersen and Liefferink, 1997; Kern, Jörgens and 
Jänicke, 2001: 4-5). In the shadow of future international regulations, there thus often evolves 
an international dynamic where states race to adopt national regulations which are directed 
towards the same policy problem; but which may differ with regard to administrative and tech-
nological details or with regard to the scope or ambition of policy goals. 
The result is an often rapid emergence of numerous national regulations in a given problem 
area. Although these national approaches differ in scope or administrative detail, in their sum 
they form a global regulatory structure which in turn increases the prospect of international 
harmonization or further diffusion. Due to the higher probability of binding international regula-
tions, political competition can be expected to be more frequent in institutionally thick environ-
ments such as the European Union or – taking into account the considerable geographic over-
lap – the entire OECD-world. 
By contrast economic competition may be more likely within institutionally ‘thin’ international 
environments or issue areas where formal political authority rests largely with the nation state 
and has not been handed over to supranational or international institutions. Economic competi-
tion occurs when the increasing international economic integration and the mobility of trade and 
capital flows create pressures ‘to modify regulatory policies in order to sustain or improve na-
tional competitiveness in a global economy’ (Tews, Busch and Jörgens, 2003: 572; Holzinger 
and Knill, 2003). The result may be a ‘race to the bottom’, where countries lower their regula-
tory standards in order to avoid capital flight (Drezner, 2001a: 57-58). In practice, however, this 
process may be more complex, involving changes in policy instruments rather than directly 
lowering standards of environmental or social protection. An illustrative example can be found 
in the field of environmental protection, where it has proven almost impossible to lower emis-
sion standards once reached (Vogel, 1997: 558). Instead direct and legally binding regulations 
by national governments are being increasingly complemented or even substituted by softer 
instruments such as voluntary agreements between government and polluters or by unilateral 
self-commitments of polluting industries (De Clercq, 2002). In the wake of this change of in-
strument it becomes easier to set less ambitious policy goals or relax monitoring requirements, 
and thus de facto lower the environmental standards domestic industries have to comply with. 
Often such indirect weakening of environmental standards occurs through, and is justified by, 
the emulation of widely acknowledged foreign models such as the Dutch negotiated agree-
ments (‘covenants’), or of concepts advocated by international organizations like the OECD. 
Rather than inventing completely new approaches to environmental protection, countries thus 
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often tend to imitate the policy changes introduced by their primary competitors in order to relax 
their own environmental and social protection standards. 
However, instead of inducing a ‘race to the bottom’, the result of economic competition may 
also be a ‘race to the top’ where countries seek to emulate new and ambitious programmes at 
an early stage of their international diffusion in order to secure ‘first-mover advantages’ and not 
lag behind other states (Porter and van der Linde, 1995). In addition national policymakers may 
be encouraged by their domestic industries to raise regulatory standards to the level of the 
more strictly regulated markets. The reason behind this is that international firms will in any 
case have to meet the standards of the most highly regulated markets if they want to sell their 
products there. Instead of manufacturing products with different environmental properties for 
different markets, they may be interested in harmonizing product standards at the level of the 
most highly regulated market in order to be able to produce similar products for all markets at 
overall lower costs (Vogel, 1997: 561-563). 
3.3.2 Determinants of Policy Diffusion 
Independent of the concrete motivations of actors to engage in processes of imitation or learn-
ing, four groups of factors influence the probability, the speed, and the course of policy diffu-
sion: (1) the existence of international or transnational channels of communication through 
which information on policies in other political constituencies can be communicated; (2) the 
specific properties of policy innovations; (3) the specific structure of the problem that a given 
policy innovation is expected to deal with; and (4) the national capacities for adopting particular 
policy innovations.19 These factors help explain why some policy innovations spread faster than 
others, why some countries are faster than others in adopting policy innovations, and why the 
speed of diffusion varies from one set of countries to another (Jörgens, 2001). 
Transnational channels of communication provide the basic infrastructure for knowledge about 
new policy instruments, programmes or institutions to travel from one jurisdiction to another. In 
a very basic sense, they take the form of international or global issue-networks where state and 
non-state actors meet on a regular basis to exchange information and to coordinate national 
policies and programmes. Examples of such issue-specific networks include: transnational ad-
vocacy networks (Keck and Sikkink, 1998) and epistemic communities (Haas, 1992) which in-
ternationally promote their subjective framing of specific policy problems and their causal be-
liefs of how to solve these problems; intergovernmental networks of policymakers, experts and 
NGO-representatives which centre around specific policy innovations such as national envi-
ronmental policy plans (International Network of Green Planners) or national ecolabels (Global 
Ecolabeling Network); and international organizations like the United Nations, the OECD or the 
                                                
19 For a detailed account of the effects of these factors on the diffusion of environmental policy innovations see Kern, Jörgens 
and Jänicke (2001) and Tews, Busch and Jörgens (2003). 
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European Union which provide issue-specific arenas where national officials regularly meet, 
exchange information and coordinate their national policies (Kern, Jörgens and Jänicke, 2001). 
In addition to providing arenas where national policymakers regularly meet, many international 
organizations and intergovernmental networks are actors in their own right, describing and ex-
amining policy innovations or best practices in front-runner countries, and making this informa-
tion available in a wide range of publications, in internal policy papers, and at international con-
ferences. Elizabeth Bomberg and John Peterson (2000:19) have identified ‘institutionalized 
peer-review and identification of best practice according to agreed criteria ('benchmarking')’ as 
one of the major tools of policy transfer within the European Union. The explicit aim of these 
benchmarking activities is to foster the international diffusion of policy innovations in a given 
issue area and to harmonize national regulations and strategies at a high level (Kern, Jörgens 
and Jänicke, 2001: 9). With regard to sustainable development, the United Nations Commis-
sion on Sustainable Development regularly publishes status reports on the national implemen-
tation of Agenda 21 – the latest of which was prepared for the 2002 World Summit on Sustain-
able Development in Johannesburg. In a similar vein think tanks, consultancy firms or founda-
tions regularly disseminate information on best practice and advocate new policies at the na-
tional and international level (Stone, 2000). 
While the existence of international channels of communication determines whether policy dif-
fusion can occur at all, the specific properties of policy innovations are decisive for the speed at 
which an innovation spreads in the international system (Jörgens, 2001). Policy innovations 
whose adoption requires only incremental changes to existing policy styles and institutional 
structures are more likely to be adopted than policies which conflict strongly with existing regu-
latory traditions (Rose, 1993: 135f.; Kern, Jörgens and Jänicke, 2001: 11-12). Similarly when 
policies contradict the interests of important domestic actors, national policymakers are likely to 
encounter strong opposition against their adoption. Generally, it can be expected that redis-
tributive policies spread more slowly than regulative policies, and that regulative policies in turn 
diffuse less rapidly than distributive or informational approaches (Lowi, 1972; Kern, Jänicke and 
Jörgens, 2000). Scholars of organizational sociology argue that policy innovations practiced in 
pioneering countries diffuse more rapidly throughout a social system if it is possible to detach 
them from the specific national context in which they evolved, and to develop an abstract model 
that can be applied to a wider range of national contexts (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983: 155-156; 
Strang and Meyer 1993). Or, as Strang and Soule put it: ‘(...) practices do not flow. Theorized 
models and careful framings do’ (Strang and Soule, 1998: 277). 
Of course theorizing requires an agent that engages in this task. Developing abstract and uni-
versally applicable models is, therefore, one of the core strategies of transnational advocacy 
networks, international organizations or epistemic communities which seek to empower interna-
tional norms at the level of the nation state. It is obvious, that the inherent properties of individ-
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ual policy innovations make them more or less suitable for generalization and thus affect their 
prospect of diffusion. 
Similar to the characteristics of policy innovations, the specific structure of the problems that 
policy innovations are designed to tackle may also influence the speed of diffusion. In their 
large-scale comparison of national environmental policies, Martin Jänicke and Helmut Weidner 
have demonstrated that ‘the structure of the problem, in terms of its visibility and urgency, the 
availability of a standard technological solution and the societal importance and composition of 
the relevant target groups’, significantly determines whether a problem reaches the domestic 
agenda or not (Jänicke and Weidner, 1997: 310). 
Finally the national context of the adopting state acts as a filter for the transfer of policies from 
one political setting to another. The domestic context includes administrative or regulative tradi-
tions and national policy styles as well as national capacities to actually adopt and implement a 
given policy. It is of crucial importance not only to processes of policy diffusion, but has also 
repeatedly been identified as a decisive factor for international harmonization, that is for the 
national transposition and implementation of international or European law. The basic proposi-
tion developed, especially in the literature on Europeanization, is that the ‘goodness of fit’ be-
tween the European and the domestic level (that is, the degree to which European norms 
‘resonate’ with domestic political, institutional and cultural structures) conditions the degree and 
extent to which national settings can change in response to international norms (Cowles, Capo-
raso and Risse, 2001; Börzel and Risse, 2003; Checkel, 1999). While in cases of international 
or European obligatory harmonization the pressure for change is high and will thus lead to 
some kind of national adaptation (Knill and Lehmkuhl, 2002); in cases of non-obligatory diffu-
sion, misfit between global norms and domestic structures may completely preclude national 
adoption of a policy model or lead to substantive changes of the original policy model in the 
course of adoption (see for example Rose, 1993). 
Besides the ‘goodness of fit’ between global norms and domestic structures, the national politi-
cal, financial, scientific and technological capacities to implement a particular policy innovation 
determine whether a country voluntarily adopts a foreign model or not (Tews, Busch and Jör-
gens, 2003: 575-576; Kern, Jörgens and Jänicke, 2001: 8). The limited capacity of many, espe-
cially developing or transitional countries, may constitute a crucial obstacle to ‘soft’ policy diffu-
sion as it can be expected that countries first implement those norms and policies that are set 
down in international obligatory law or which they are coerced by other states or organizations 
to implement. Voluntary imitation or learning, then, may be found especially in those areas 
where harmonization and imposition are largely absent. 
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4 Theoretical Relevance of the Typology of Governance Mechanisms 
The typology of governance mechanisms put forward here is consistent with other scholarly 
efforts to systematize the ways in which states are influenced by their external environment. 
The triad of harmonization, imposition and diffusion was first introduced to describe the exoge-
nous determinants of national policymaking by Colin Bennett (1991) and Michael Howlett 
(2000) in their work on international policy convergence.20 Both authors argue that – in addition 
to contextual factors like the general functional prerequisites of modernization (Collier and 
Messick, 1975), or more idiosyncratic national factors – the increasing convergence of national 
policies is the result of international or transnational influences that can best be systematized 
through these three mechanisms. In a similar vein Dolowitz and Marsh (2000: 13-17) concep-
tualize different types of policy transfer along a continuum ranging from voluntary lesson-
drawing to obligated transfer and to direct imposition. Finally, with a focus on the study of inter-
national regimes, Oran Young distinguishes three different paths to regime formation which 
closely resemble the broader governance mechanisms proposed here: ‘negotiation’, where 
international regimes are set up by explicit agreements; ‘imposition’, where regimes are exter-
nally forced upon actors; and ‘spontaneous emergence’, where governance evolves from the 
converging expectations of many individual actions (Young, 1983: 98-101, 1997: 10-11). 
Governance processes similar to those observable in the world of states can also be found in 
the world of organizations. In the field of organizational sociology, DiMaggio and Powell (1983) 
have argued that institutional isomorphism – that is, the process through which organizations 
within a given social system grow similar over time – can be either ‘coercive’, ‘mimetic’ or ‘nor-
mative’. Contrary to the model proposed here DiMaggio and Powell subsume both asymmetric 
power relationships and legal standard-setting under the heading of ‘coercive isomorphism’. In 
return, both mimetic and normative isomorphism are variants of what is here labeled diffusion. 
While these differences are mainly attributable to differences in the subject of analysis – nation 
states in the one case and societal organizations in the other – the work of DiMaggio and Pow-
ell makes a strong argument for the importance of non-hierarchical imitation and learning, even 
in those environments where authoritative decision-making by governments is a valid option. 
In more abstract terms the three governance mechanisms identified in this paper reflect the 
three major structuring forces of modern society: interest, power and knowledge. Interest and 
cooperation stand at the core of rationalist and neo-institutionalist theories in international rela-
tions21; power and coercion are the central explanatory categories of realist and neo-realist ap-
proaches22; and knowledge and the diffusion of principles and ideas are given particular em-
                                                
20 The terms Howlett (2000) uses are ‘harmonization’, ‘domination’ and ‘emulation’. Bennett (1991) originally had distinguished 
four international causes of policy convergence: ‘emulation’, ‘harmonization’, ‘elite networking’, and ‘penetration’. 
21 Keohane (1984), Martin and Simmons (1998), Simmons and Martin (2002). 
22 For a recent and differentiated application of the neo-realist paradigm with regard to global governance, see Drezner 
(2001b). 
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phasis in constructivist and idealist accounts23. The typology of governance mechanisms de-
veloped here is thus not exclusively linked to any particular theoretical school in international 
relations, but can serve as a heuristic device within realist, rationalist, and constructivist frame-
works. 
Of course the differences in this typology are mainly analytical. The three governance mecha-
nisms are not always empirically distinct. For example when the World Bank or the International 
Monetary Fund require that countries change their national economic policies as a precondition 
for development loans, this process would normally be classified as a case of external imposi-
tion, where IMF or World Bank conditions stand in opposition to the interests of national poli-
cymakers. Research on IMF and World Bank conditionality has shown, however, that, in some 
cases, national policymakers actually favor the external imposition of the policy models ad-
vanced by international organizations so they can blame the external donor organization for 
unpopular policy choices which, in fact, they have deliberately chosen (Vreeland, 2003). For-
mally such a case would be classified as imposition. Substantially, however, it would at least in 
part resemble harmonization in that the motivations to act of both the source and the target of 
governance are partly identical and the new policies have been purposely chosen by the adopt-
ing country. While in concrete empirical settings, the borders between the different governance 
mechanisms may at times be blurred, analytically the typology helps to shed light on the differ-
ent motivations of actors to implement global norms domestically and to explain different de-
grees of norm implementation across countries and issue areas. 
In the next section the analysis focuses on the international spread of national environmental 
policy plans and sustainable development strategies in order to assess the role policy diffusion 
plays in this process, and to find out how diffusion interacts with harmonization and imposition 
in an integrated attempt to improve global governance for sustainable development. 
5 Explaining the Global Spread of Sustainable Development Strategies 
5.1 Implementing Sustainable Development Through National Sustainable  
Development Strategies 
National environmental policy plans and sustainable development strategies constitute one of 
the most important attempts to adapt the global norm of sustainable development to individual 
domestic contexts (Lafferty and Meadowcroft, 2000; Jänicke and Jörgens, 2000a; Dalal-
Clayton, 1996: 3). This makes these initiatives an ideal object for an empirically grounded 
analysis of how – that is, through which governance mechanisms – the international norm of 
sustainable development reaches the national level. 
                                                
23 See for example Risse, Ropp and Sikkink (1999), Checkel (1999), Finnemore (1996), and – within sociology – Meyer et al. 
(1997). 
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Basically environmental policy plans and sustainable development strategies can be defined as 
comprehensive governmental programmes of action which are developed with the participation 
of a wide range of societal actors and which formulate medium- and long-term cross-sectoral 
goals and priorities for an economically and socially sound environmental policy (Jänicke, Jör-
gens and Koll, 2001). Empirically, two types of strategic approaches can be distinguished: envi-
ronmental policy plans (or ‘green’ plans) which focus predominantly on the solution of environ-
mental problems and perceive social and economic aspects merely as important constraints for 
the attainment of environmental goals, and sustainable development strategies which follow a 
more holistic approach and attempt to set separate goals for all three dimensions of sustainable 
development, that is, formulate environmental, social and economic goals. Ideally both envi-
ronmental policy plans and sustainable development strategies involve the following key ele-
ments (Jänicke and Jörgens, 1998; OECD, 2001b): 
• the formulation of long-term goals for environmentally sustainable development (goal-
orientation), 
• the foundation of these goals in a detailed analysis of the whole range of national envi-
ronmental and sustainable development problems (problem-orientation), 
• the cooperative development of goals and actions among the relevant national ministries 
and agencies (policy integration), 
• the involvement of polluters and target groups as well as concerned societal groups in 
the process of decision-making (target-group policy and participation), 
• regular reporting and policy-evaluation (monitoring), and 
• the continuous development of the strategy process (process-orientation). 
Since the late 1980s, 140 countries in the world have adopted official national ‘green plans’ or 
sustainable development strategies (Busch and Jörgens, 2003, see Figure 1). While most na-
tional strategies differ substantially from the ideal-type model outlined above – notably with re-
gard to the extent of societal participation, the problem-adequacy of goals and measures, the 
degree of policy integration and the quality of reporting and monitoring foreseen in the strategy 
– clearly they have to be interpreted as part of a worldwide process of putting the global con-
cept of sustainable development into practice at the domestic level (Lafferty and Meadowcroft, 
2000; Jänicke and Jörgens, 2000b; Lafferty, 2004). 
From a governance perspective this impressive global spread of sustainable development 
strategies raises the following questions: How has the proliferation of green plans and sustain-
able development strategies come about? What have been its main causes and driving forces? 
Through which mechanisms has the global norm of ecologically sustainable development been 
sought implemented at the national level? And how have these mechanisms interacted with 
each other? These questions will be addressed in the following by assessing the role of har-
monization, imposition and diffusion as analytic processes affecting the global spread of strate-
gic sustainable development plans and how these mechanisms affected each other. 
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5.2 Planning for Sustainable Development in Industrialized Countries: 
From Problem-pressure and Diffusion to International Harmonization 
Among OECD member states the initial stimuli for the development of national environmental 
and sustainable development strategies were twofold. On the one hand environmental pres-
sures had increased in most industrialized countries throughout the early 1980s, and public 
concern for environmental protection had grown significantly due to widely visible environ-
mental disasters such as the large-scale forest dieback in Germany and other European coun-
tries in the mid-1980s or the Chernobyl accident of 1986. On the other hand the development of 
the concept of sustainable development, with point of departure in the Brundtland-Report of 
1987 and with an emphasis on long-term sustainability, an integrated approach to environ-
mental, social and economic problems, and a more participative model of decision-making and 
implementation, provided a common theme for future environmental policy (Jänicke, Carius and 
Jörgens, 1997: 24). 
Against this background the first OECD countries to adopt a national green plan were Denmark 
and the Netherlands. Both the Danish Action Plan for Environment and Development of 1988 
and the Dutch National Environmental Policy Plan (NEPP) of 1989 were influenced by domestic 
environmental pressures as well as the UN-backed concept of sustainable development. How-
ever while the Danish action plan went relatively unnoticed, the Dutch NEPP received consid-
erable attention outside the Netherlands, and was rapidly elevated into a widely recognized 
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model for the national implementation of sustainable development (Liefferink, 1999). Shortly 
after the publication of the Brundtland Report (WCED 1987) the Dutch government designated 
sustainable development as ‘the general guideline for overall Dutch government policy’ (Bress-
ers and Plettenburg, 1997: 125). The NEPP specified this claim by setting an overarching tar-
get of achieving sustainable development in the Netherlands by the year 2010. With a rather 
technocratic vision of sustainable development (aimed predominantly at ‘reducing environ-
mental impacts rather than promoting societal change’ (Bennett, 1997: 81)), the NEPP set the 
stage for a first generation of green plans and sustainable development strategies which were 
mainly concerned with the ecological dimension of sustainable development. 



































Source: Busch and Jörgens (2003) 
In the course of the 1990s, the Dutch National Environmental Policy Plan was directly or indi-
rectly imitated by several industrialized countries and by the European Commission, and 
served as an important source of inspiration to others. The European Union’s Fifth Environ-
mental Action Programme of 1992 entitled ‘Towards an Environmentally Sustainable Develop-
ment’, which itself strongly influenced the development of green plans and sustainable devel-
opment strategies in numerous Western and Eastern European countries, was directly modeled 
upon the NEPP. Just like its Dutch counterpart, it is built around core environmental themes 
and target groups, and calls for a shift from hierarchical regulation towards a stronger involve-
ment of societal actors and a broader mix of instruments in environmental policy (Donkers, 
2000). This close similarity was mainly a result of the active promulgation of the NEPP-
approach by the Dutch government, which also included (significantly) the relocation of Dutch 
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civil servants who had been involved in the development of the NEPP to the European Com-
mission. Consequently several of the key participants in the preparation of the Fifth Environ-
mental Action Programme were were ‘schooled’ in the Netherlands, including the Commission’s 
Director General for the Environment as well as one of the lead authors of the Action Pro-
gramme (Liefferink, 1999: 273). Other national strategies that were modeled upon either the 
NEPP or the Fifth Environmental Action Programme include the Portuguese and Latvian na-
tional environmental policy plans, both adopted in 1995; and the Irish sustainable development 
strategy of 1997 which centers around key polluting sectors and introduces sectoral ‘task man-
agers’ who are to oversee the implementation of the strategy for the various sectors and who 
strongly resemble the ‘target group managers’ introduced by the Dutch NEPP (Bressers and 
Plettenburg, 1997: 116). 
While the NEPP was diffused to the EU-level through active promotion and persuasion on the 
part of the Dutch government, the Austrian National Environmental Plan of 1995 in turn emu-
lated the European Union’s Fifth Environmental Action Programme in a clear effort by the Aus-
trian government to appear modern and ecologically responsible. As stated by Pleschberger: 
‘(...) the Austrian plan is the imitation and adoption of “higher” environmentally related policy 
developments. Old and new documents of the global and European environmental policy 
are repeatedly mentioned as reference sources in the national plan. In addition, the target 
sectors selected as areas for policy involvement are drawn from the Fifth Environmental Ac-
tion Programme of the EU. This shows that the new Austrian environmental policy places it-
self demonstratively within the context of supranational and global environmental policy 
which serves as the legitimizing source for national policy efforts’ (Pleschberger, 1999: 222). 
The development of the Canadian Green Plan in 1990 was to an important degree the result of 
a movement of decision-makers from one political setting to another, as the ideas developed in 
the Brundtland Commission quickly spread to the Canadian political debate through the in-
volvement of high-level policymakers who were active in both the domestic and the interna-
tional arena (Gale, 1997: 100-101). 
In addition to the above illustrated cases of bilateral policy transfer and ‘policy insemination’, 
the spread of sustainable development strategies within the group of industrialized countries 
was from the early 1990s on strongly influenced by an increasing international coordination and 
institutionalization of diffusion processes. The most important step in this regard was a recom-
mendation put forth in the UN ‘action plan’ from Rio, Agenda 21, stating that: 
‘Governments, in cooperation, where appropriate, with international organizations, should 
adopt a national strategy for sustainable development (...). This strategy should build upon 
and harmonize the various sectoral economic, social and environmental policies and plans 
that are operating in the country. The experience gained through existing planning exercises 
such as national reports for the Conference, national conservation strategies and environ-
ment action plans should be fully used and incorporated into a country-driven sustainable 
development strategy. Its goals should be to ensure socially responsible economic devel-
opment while protecting the resource base and the environment for the benefit of future 
generations. It should be developed through the widest possible participation’ (United Na-
tions 1994, Article 8.7, p. 67). 
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The recommendation of Agenda 21 was not legally binding for the signatory states and did not 
specify any point in time for when compliance was expected. It therefore involved a relatively 
low degree of formal obligation. It entirely changed, however, the political-institutional issue 
structure in which national governments operate. Following the Rio Earth Summit a wide range 
of domestic or transnational governmental or non-governmental actors started using Agenda 21 
and its prescription of national sustainable development strategies as a point of reference for 
their demands. Shortly after UNCED the OECD included the existence or non-existence of a 
green plan or a national sustainable development strategy as a criterion for evaluation in their 
national ‘Environmental Performance Review’ process: a high-level peer review and bench-
marking exercise whereby national environmental policies are evaluated by changing teams of 
experts from other OECD countries, with the results promulgated through a widely dissemi-
nated book series (OECD, 2001c). The international environmental NGO, Friends of the Earth, 
developed detailed proposals of ambitious sustainable development strategies for the Euro-
pean Union, the Netherlands and Germany, and initiated public campaigns to urge govern-
ments to engage in the process of strategy formulation (Jänicke, Jörgens and Koll, 2000: 222). 
Also in direct response to the Agenda 21 recommendation on sustainable development strate-
gies, an International Network of Green Planners was set up in 1992 by policy experts from the 
environmental ministries of Canada and the Netherlands, from Malaysia, UNDP, UNEP and the 
OECD as a global forum for policymakers to share information, learn from national experiences 
and promote the diffusion of national green plans and sustainable development strategies.24 
Finally, at the domestic level, opposition parties as well as environmental groups have regularly 
pressed governments to develop sustainable development strategies by pointing to the recom-
mendation laid down in Agenda 21 and to the fact that virtually all world governments have 
formally approved the global action plan. 
During the period following the Rio Conference the number of OECD countries which had for-
mally adopted a green plan or a sustainable development strategy rose from ten by the end of 
1991 to 21 in 1997 (Figure 2). Almost all of these national plans and strategies include promi-
nent references to the 1992 Earth Summit and Agenda 21’s admonition to develop national 
sustainable development strategies. Many of the European strategies additionally refer to the 
5th Environmental Action Programme of the European Union. Although these references cannot 
be interpreted as proof of a causal relationship, they at least indicate strong and high-level 
awareness among national policymakers of the international dynamics that have evolved 
around the issue of sustainable development strategies. 
The above examples as well as the pattern of spread illustrated in Figure 2 thus strongly sug-
gest that cross-national diffusion has played a significant role for the dispersion of green plans 
and sustainable development strategies throughout the OECD. Moreover, they shed light on 
the specific pathways through which diffusion occurs. Diffusion can, however, only explain one 
                                                
24 The history of the INGP as well as its aims and activities are described in detail on the INGP-website (http://www.ingp.org). 
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– albeit a significant – part of the international emergence of strategic environmental planning. 
On the one hand some of the national approaches have clearly been primarily triggered by na-
tional problem pressures and unique political developments at the domestic level, as for exam-
ple the UK White Paper from 1990 on ‘This Common Inheritance’ (Wilkinson, 1997), or the 
French Green Plan of the same year. 
On the other hand, in the course of the 1990s, a gradual shift of the dominant governance 
mechanism regarding the promotion of national sustainable development strategies in industri-
alized countries from diffusion to soft harmonization can be observed. The recommendation of 
Agenda 21 that all nations adopt a sustainable development strategy was an initial – albeit very 
general – initiative to coordinate the manner through which sustainable development was to be 
implemented domestically. In 1997 the General Assembly of the UN reaffirmed and strength-
ened this claim at their 19th Special Session (the so-called ‘Earth Summit plus 5’) by setting a 
definite deadline, the year 2002, for the completion of the national sustainable development 
strategies (UN, 1997). While UN declarations and action programs as well as General Assem-
bly resolutions do not constitute binding international law in a strict sense, both Agenda 21 and 
the 1997 resolution contain supervisory mechanisms which are characteristic of so-called ‘hard 
law’. In 1992, following the Earth Summit, the Commission on Sustainable Development was 
created as a supervisory organ to oversee the implementation of Agenda 21. Five years later, 
in 1997, the UN General Assembly concluded that all nations were to present their sustainable 
development strategies at the 2002 World Summit on Sustainable Development in Johannes-
burg – thus creating a public venue where non-compliance by any country would be widely 
visible to other states as well as a wide range of domestic and international NGOs. It can be 
argued, therefore, that in the course of the 1990s, and especially since 1997, ‘soft-law’ har-
monization has increasingly become a dominant mechanism of global governance for sustain-
able development. 
This shift towards ‘soft’ harmonization became possible, among other reasons, because by 
1997, roughly 120 countries throughout the world had already adopted some form of national 
environmental or sustainable development strategy (see Figure 1). Thus by 1997 a point had 
been reached where it would have been difficult for any single country to openly refuse to adopt 
a national programme for sustainable development or to oppose a corresponding decision 
within the United Nations. The rapid diffusion of this policy innovation throughout most of the 
1990s thus paved the way for subsequent legal harmonization. 
But what were the broader effects of this change of governance mode? First of all it can be 
observed that after 1997 the spread of green plans and sustainable development strategies did 
not accelerate. Compared to the dynamic period from 1994 to 1997, the rate of national adop-
tions clearly decreased after 1997. If we take into account, however, the fact that approximately 
three quarters of the OECD countries had already introduced a national strategy by the year 
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1997, and that in some of the remaining countries such a step was being openly debated25, it is 
doubtful that the decreasing rates of adoption are causally related to the shift towards legal 
harmonization. 
The picture of a general slowdown of the spread of environmental strategies in the late 1990s 
fades even more if one differentiates between environmental policy plans and sustainable de-
velopment strategies and focuses on the international spread of the latter, more comprehen-
sive, approach to strategic planning.26 Altogether, since 1997, 15 out of 29 OECD countries 
have formally adopted a national strategy for sustainable development (Figure 3). Three more 
countries – the Netherlands, Portugal and Spain – have presented a complete draft strategy 
together with a plan to officially adopt their sustainable development strategies by 2004. Hun-
gary has only recently started preparing a strategy which is to be completed in 2004. Only four 
OECD countries – Mexico, New Zealand, Turkey and the USA – have not yet adopted a na-
tional sustainable development strategy or announced its publication for the near future. 



































Source: Busch and Jörgens (2003) 
                                                
25 For a contribution to the German debate on the formulation of a national environmental policy plan, see Jänicke, Carius and 
Jörgens (1997). 
26 From the late 1980s until the second half of the 1990s the formulation of environmental policy plans was the dominant ap-
proach to implementing sustainable development domestically. Sustainable development was mainly understood by policy-
makers in the sense of ‘ecologically’ sustainable development. This understanding of sustainable development gradually 
changed in the late 1990s and the early 2000s to include economic and social goals on an equal footing. As a result com-
prehensive sustainable development strategies increasingly replaced the more environmentally focused green plans as the 
prevalent measure for implementing Agenda 21. In the course of this redefinition of sustainable development, many coun-
tries that already had a national green plan in place began to engage in a parallel process of formulating a sustainable de-
velopment strategy (examples are Denmark, France, Austria, Portugal and the Netherlands). 
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What is even more striking than the rapid spread of these strategies, however, is the fact that 
roughly one third of all OECD countries – ten out of 29 – have either formally adopted their 
strategy or presented a complete draft in the year 2002, the year agreed by the UN General 
Assembly as the official deadline for compliance. All of these more recent strategies and most 
of the earlier ones make a clear reference to Agenda 21 and to the 1997 decision of the UN 
General Assembly as important external stimuli.27 
In sum the analysis of the spread of green plans and sustainable development strategies in 
OECD countries shows that while in the first phase from the late 1980s to the second half of the 
1990s diffusion was the dominant mechanism of global governance for sustainable develop-
ment, in 1997 this mechanism was complemented by a process of ‘soft’ harmonization of na-
tional sustainable development processes. Since roughly three quarters of all OECD countries 
had already adopted a green plan or sustainable development strategy at the time of the UN 
decision, the overall spread of these programmes did not accelerate in response to the shifting 
mode of governance. However, a distinction between green plans and sustainable develop-
ment strategies reveals that, especially in the year 2002, there has been a rapid spread of the 
latter which can only be explained by the harmonizing power of the resolution adopted by the 
UN General Assembly in 1997 and the substantial pressure placed upon countries by the re-
quirement to present their national strategies at the 2002 World Summit on Sustainable Devel-
opment. 
5.3 National Action Plans and Strategies in Developing and Transitional Countries: 
Imposition Through Economic and Political Conditionality 
The active propagation of the policy innovation by international organizations such as the UN or 
the OECD; the existence of a model strategy that is sufficiently general to fit different national 
contexts; the growth of transnational communication networks to spread information on this 
policy innovation; and the adoption of a formal obligation for countries to develop a strategy by 
2002 – all were factors that applied not only to OECD countries, but also to the developing 
countries of Africa and Latin America and to the transitional countries of Central and Eastern 
Europe. However the dominant governance mechanism for implementing sustainable devel-
opment at the national level in developing and transitional countries was neither diffusion nor 
harmonization, but imposition. More precisely economic conditionality was the principal mecha-
nism through which the global goal of Agenda 21, stipulating that all countries should adopt a 
national strategy for sustainable development, was implemented in these countries. And inter-
national organizations were the main actors pushing developing countries to prepare environ-
mental and sustainable development strategies. 
                                                
27 This overwhelming compliance with non-binding international ‘soft law’ also makes a strong case for managerial explanations 
of compliance with international agreements which argue that states possess an inherent motivation to act in accordance 
with norms which they have voluntarily agreed to and that this motivation can be strengthened by non-coercive tools such as 
monitoring or reporting (Chayes and Chayes, 1993; Brown-Weiss and Jacobson, 2000). 
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The single most important actor in this respect has been the World Bank. In 1987 the bank 
started to support National Environmental Action Plans (NEAPs) – national planning processes 
to ‘describe the basic environmental situation of a country, identify the principal causes of envi-
ronmental problems and draft a strategy by which to tackle prioritized problems’ (Heidbrink and 
Paulus, 2000: 16) – in Madagascar, Lesotho, Mauritius and the Seychelles. In 1990 the Interna-
tional Development Assistance (IDA), a World Bank affiliate that provides low-interest loans to 
the world’s poorest countries, started urging its borrowers on a more general basis to develop 
national environmental action plans. Finally this approach was formalized in 1992 when the 
World Bank adopted its Operational Directive OD 4.02 on Environmental Action Plans. By mak-
ing NEAPs a necessary precondition for gaining access to funding, this operational directive 
effectively made this type of environmental strategy mandatory for IDA countries (Heidbrink and 
Paulus, 2000: 19). For other countries the World Bank strongly recommended that they elabo-
rate NEAPs. Besides being a precondition for external financial aid in general, NEAPs also 
pointed out specific environmental projects that could be financed by external donors. 
The preparation of national environmental action plans in all IDA borrowing countries and in 
most other developing countries throughout the 1990s was, therefore, mainly driven by external 
imposition through economic conditionality. Without this external pressure the number of coun-
tries voluntarily preparing national environmental strategies would certainly have been much 
smaller. The example of national conservation strategies – which since the early 1980s were 
technically and financially supported by the International Union for the Conservation of Nature 
(IUCN) in cooperation with the UN Development Programme (UNEP) and the World Wide Fund 
for Nature (WWF), and which can be regarded as an early predecessor of NEAPs – shows that 
also in the absence of economic coercion, the willingness and capacity of governments in de-
veloping countries to prepare national environmental strategies depends strongly on external 
initiative and funding. 
In Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) and in the New Independent States (NIS) which emerged 
from the former Soviet Union, international organizations were also the main driving forces be-
hind the preparation of national environmental strategies. Besides the World Bank, which was 
the main supporter of the development of national environmental action plans in the New Inde-
pendent States, the UN Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE) and the OECD played a 
major role for the proliferation of strategic environmental planning in this region. Since 1991 
environment ministers of UNECE member countries have regularly met at high-level confer-
ences under the title ‘Environment for Europe’. At the second meeting in Lucerne, Switzerland 
(1993) the Environmental Action Programme for Central and Eastern Europe (EAP) was en-
dorsed, recommending that CEE countries and NIS ‘develop new environmental policies 
adapted to the emerging market economies and democratic societies’. Key characteristics of 
this approach were ‘priority-setting, cost-effective use of resources and a balance of policies, 
institutional and investment actions’ (OECD, 1998: 6). Implementation of the EAP should occur, 
among other means, through the elaboration of national environmental action programmes and 
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was to be coordinated by a special task force based at the OECD (Connolly and Gutner, 2002; 
OECD, 1998). 
Within this special Eastern European setting the proliferation of national environmental action 
programmes occurred through a combination of bilateral imposition based on economic de-
pendency and diffusion based on direct interaction of policymakers and the organized ex-
change of information on national best practices within a transnational network. This issue-
specific network of coordinators of national environmental action programmes (NEAPs) was 
established under the EAP Task Force. It ‘brought together national environmental officials from 
all CEECs and the NIS who had the primary responsibility for developing environmental policies 
and preparing NEAPs. The main function of the Network was to support a mutual effort in “learn-
ing by doing” – exchanging experience, identifying “best practices”, and stimulating co-operation 
and support among network members’ (OECD, 1998: 20). At the same time within this network, 
‘various bilateral and multilateral agencies provided support for the development of NEAPs in 
some countries’ (OECD, 1998: 20) resulting in NEAPs ‘being implemented throughout CEE, pri-
marily at the direct instigation of aid donors who have insisted on such planning exercises as a 
necessary prerequisite to cost-effective environmental investments’ (Connolly and Gutner, 2002). 
Between 1991 and 1999, 16 out of 18 Central and Eastern European countries adopted a na-
tional environmental action plan, and by 2003, all CEE states possessed such a strategy (Fig-
ure 4). In the New Independent States the elaboration of NEAPs started later than in the CEE 
countries, but has developed at a similar pace in the late 1990s, mainly due to World Bank sup-
port (OECD, 1998: 49). 
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At first glance the fast proliferation of environmental action plans and programmes in develop-
ing and transitional countries seems to suggest that economic conditionality, combined with the 
coordinated dissemination of guidelines and information on best practices, constitutes a 
mechanism of global governance that is comparable to the voluntary diffusion or the negotiated 
harmonization of national policies. This picture changes, however, if one takes a look at the 
elaboration of more comprehensive strategies for sustainable development which go beyond 
the narrow field of environmental policy, and which explicitly include goals and measures in the 
social and economic sphere. While in the OECD almost all countries followed the formal obliga-
tion of Agenda 21 and the UN General Assembly to adopt such a strategy by the year 2002, 
compliance in the group of CEE countries and New Independent States has been much 
weaker, with only 10 out of 18 countries having adopted a sustainable development strategy by 
then (Figure 5). Almost half the countries of Central and Eastern Europe as well as the over-
whelming majority of the developing countries have, therefore, not been able to move from the 
adoption of an environmental action plan – which constitutes merely a first, far from sufficient, 
step in the process of implementing sustainable development domestically – to the develop-
ment of a comprehensive national strategy of sustainable development which better takes into 
account the interdependencies between environmental, social and economic goals. 
This striking difference between the group of industrialized countries, which overall has suc-
cessfully established the strategic framework for implementing both the ecological core of sus-
tainable development and its broader social and economic implications, and the group of transi-
tional and developing countries, which in their large majority have not been able to move be-
yond the adoption of rather narrow national environmental action programmes, can be ex-
plained by a combination of two factors: (1) the governance mechanism through which the 
global norm of sustainable development has been transported to the national level; and (2) the 
domestic political and institutional capacities for its actual implementation. 
Contrary to the other modes of global governance – harmonization and diffusion – imposition 
through economic conditionality leaves little choice for the target countries to set their own po-
litical priorities based on their national political, adminstrative and scientific capacities. In devel-
oping and transitional countries, where the domestic capacities for implementing sustainable 
development are limited, the external imposition of national environmental action plans has 
absorbed most of these capacities. In fact, a closer look into the national reports prepared for 
the 2002 World Summit on Sustainable Development in Johannesburg by Central and Eastern 
European countries and the NIS reveals that many of these countries explain their failure to 
elaborate a national sustainable development strategy with their lack of capacity to engage in 
different processes of reporting and strategy formulation at the same time.28 While most indus-
                                                
28 The national reports to the World Summit on Sustainable Development can be found on the internet under 
http://www.johannesburgsummit.org/html/prep_process/natlassessrep.html and http://www.earthsummit2002.org/es/national-
resources/nssd.htm. 
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trialized countries and the European Union hold sufficient capacity to engage in successive or 
overlapping planning processes, many Eastern European and most developing countries con-
centrated their scarce financial, administrative and technical capacities on fulfilling the require-
ments imposed by multilateral or bilateral donor organizations and subsequently failed to fulfill 
their international legal commitments. 
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6 Conclusions 
The analysis of the worldwide proliferation of green plans and sustainable development strate-
gies shows that diffusion is an essential component of global governance for sustainable de-
velopment. As a mechanism of global governance diffusion is analytically distinct from har-
monization and imposition. While each of these three mechanisms by itself is an important 
source of order in world politics, it is the interaction of the three mechanisms that is most inter-
esting from a policy-analysis point of view. The case study of green plans and sustainable de-
velopment strategies illustrates this interaction and shows how the different governance 
mechanisms can both strengthen or obstruct each other. 
In the early phases of global regulation of an issue area, diffusion can play an important role in 
the process of agenda-setting. Especially in those issue areas where international harmoniza-
tion is difficult to reach – that is in almost every case of regulatory or redistributive intervention 
restricting economic activity or any other type of individual or collective behavior – processes of 
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loosely coordinated cross-national imitation and learning can gradually build up a critical mass 
of proponents, increase acceptance in the more reluctant countries, and thus pave the way for 
subsequent legal harmonization. As the example of green plans and sustainable development 
strategies shows, diffusion can also significantly increase the legitimacy of a global norm, thus 
making it nearly impossible for any modern and ‘civilized’ state to openly oppose it. 
However, once harmonization is reached, imitation and learning do not simply stop. Rather, 
once a legal agreement has been reached, the dissemination of information on model policies 
and examples of international best practice within transnational networks and the emulation of 
these models by individual countries can be seen as an important vehicle for the implementa-
tion of the agreement. As the case study clearly demonstrates, the mechanisms of diffusion 
and harmonization regularly interact with each other, leading to a process of mutual re-
enforcement. In this combined governance mode, where diffusion and harmonization interact in 
a specific way, harmonization determines the general direction of domestic policy change, while 
diffusion has an important impact on the speed and the distinctive details of national implemen-
tation. 
One major lesson that can be drawn from this case study is, therefore, that the creation of fa-
vorable conditions for policy diffusion is an essential, but often underestimated, aspect of effec-
tive global governance. Contrary to the negotiation of international treaties and agreements, the 
improvement of the infrastructure for diffusion can be carried out unilaterally or within a small 
group of pioneer countries and international organizations. The creation of the International 
Network of Green Planners by a group of Dutch and Canadian policymakers, or the inclusion of 
green plans as a criterion for evaluation in the OECD Environmental Performance Reviews 
series, can serve as examples. 
Contrary to harmonization and diffusion, imposition depends primarily on asymmetric power 
relationships. As a mechanism of global governance, it mainly serves to force developing coun-
tries to implement an international norm which they presumably would not have adopted volun-
tarily or voted for in international negotiations. While imposition is generally very effective in 
determining domestic policy outputs, the comparison of the proliferation of NEAPs and sustain-
able development strategies in Eastern Europe and in the developing countries shows that, 
ultimately, national capacities are a decisive constraint for the domestic implementation of 
global norms, and that governance by imposition more than any other form of global govern-
ance binds scarce national capacities and thus strongly restricts the policy options of develop-
ing countries. If too many national capacities are bound by hard conditionality, this obstructs the 
diffusion of new policy innovations which may be more effective or more problem-adequate 
than those transported to the national level by processes of imposition. 
Moreover, as the case study demonstrates, imposition by economic conditionality has more 
immediate effects than processes of ‘soft’ international harmonization. In cases where proc-
esses of imposition and harmonization pursue divergent goals, countries with scarce domestic 
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capacities will most likely implement those imposed by economic conditionality at the expense 
of those goals that had been jointly agreed upon in multilateral negotiations. 
Effective governance for sustainable development must, therefore, take into account the vari-
ous interactions between all three mechanisms of global governance. While the analysis pre-
sented here highlights the importance of the unilateral development of policy models by pio-
neering states or international organizations and the creation of favorable conditions for policy 
diffusion, thus paving the way for subsequent processes of international harmonization; it also 
cautions against an excessive and uncoordinated imposition of foreign models on developing 
countries which are constrained by their limited administrative, financial, scientific and technical 
capacities. 
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